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Reply
The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship:
A Reply
Ronald K.L. Collins* & David M. Skover**
How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do
not know. For my part, I nearly forgot myself because of them,
so persuasively did they speak. And yet they have said, so to
speak, nothing true.
-Socrates'
Perhaps nobody yet has been truthful enough about what
"truthfulness" is.
-Nietzsche 2
Truth + Advertising = Insanity.
That, at least, is the formula of the comedy film Crazy People.' It
is the story of an advertising copy man who works at a respectable New
York firm run by a CEO who insists: "You have to drill, drill, drill that
target audience until they are consuming your product, not because they
love it, but because they can't escape it."' Skeptical of this philosophy,
our leading man one day decides to mend his ways and tell the truth.
"Let's not fool the public anymore .... Let's level with America," he
implores a co-worker.5 The reponse is predictable: "We can't level, you
I
* Visiting Associate Professor, George Washington University National Law Center. Co-founder
of the nonprofit Center for the Study of Commercialism, Washington, D.C.
** Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. A.B. 1974, Princeton University; J.D.
1978, Yale University.
1. PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 21 (rhomas G. West trans., 1979).
2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 93 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random House
1966) (1886).
3. CRAzY PEOPLE (Paramount Pictures 1990).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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crazy bastard. We're in advertising!"'
Ignoring this sane advice, our truth-in-advertising crusader writes ads
such as these:
* Buy [Car X]. They're boxy. But they're good. We know
they're not sexy. This is not a smart time to be sexy anyway with
so many new diseases around. Be safe instead of sexy.'
* [Ad for national phone company]. We're tired of taking your
crap. If we fold, you'll have no damn phones!
Not surprisingly, our noble friend is chauffeured off to a sanitarium.
Exaggerated as it may be, this modem-day morality play is comic
precisely because it is absurd. In a commercial culture where image is all,
truth is irrelevant, and there is no right to know,9 the notion that mass
advertising might be rational, honest, and fully informative seems
preposterous. In fact, both on and off the screen, the ad man's novel idea
was viewed not only as ludicrous but as dangerous. Thus, in the real
world, ABC and CBS refused to air promotional commercials for the film,
fearing that they might offend the networks' major advertisers." In light
of this, how would a call for truth in commercial-speech jurisprudence be
received? What would happen if the "hype" about rational decisionmaking
and self-realization were stripped from the commercial-speech doctrine?
Would the exponent of such views be treated similarly as senseless and
threatening? If so, what would this say about the psychology of contem-
porary First Amendment scholarship?
We are grateful to our colleagues Alex Kozinski, Stuart Banner,
Rodney Smolla, Leo Bogart, and Sut Jhally for their serious treatment of
our Essay and their thoughtful responses to it. We had hoped that
Commerce & Communication would prompt new debate and discussion
about certain First Amendment issues. Judging from our colleagues'
reactions, there may well be more of the former than the latter. But in the
scheme of things, who's to complain about "fighting words" and friendly
knocks where the First Amendment is concerned?
Happily, Rodney Smolla thinks enough of our work to label it "fresh
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV.
697, 738-39 (1993).
10. Laura Landro, Film Satirizing Ad Industry Plays to a Touchy Audience, WALL ST. J., Apr.
3, 1990, at BI.
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and provocative,""' "excellent,"12 and even "ingenious." 3  Equally
flattering, Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner believe that we have raised
"questions that deserve serious thought,"" including "many points upon
which we agree."15 Having "convincingly demonstrated" 6 certain
points, we are said to be "no slouches in this arena." 7 In fact, Kozinski
and Banner all too liberally label us as "among the most intelligent
members" of an entire school of thought dating back to Cicero and perhaps
"many millennia before that.""
Fortuna being what it always is (or what Machiavelli tells us it is),
one may see an author "flourishing today and ruined tomorrow, without his
having changed at all in character or qualities."19 True to fate, our three
colleagues ran out of kind words. Indeed, they argued so persuasively
against us that when they were through with us, we barely recognized
ourselves.
I. Some Daring Declarations'
Reader beware! We are not entirely what some of our colleagues
portray us to be in their responses. Before turning to those portrayals, we
think it prudent to sketch our own portrait in bolder strokes. Without the
benefit of the elaboration contained in Commerce & Communication and
our related works, we dare to declare the following:
0 The obvious import of our entire scholarly enterprise is
more descriptive than normative. Thus understood, our work is
more concerned with depicting certain forms of discourse in
contemporary America than it is with promoting any particular
theory of First Amendment jurisprudence.
0 Although our analysis often focuses on the values of the
traditional First Amendment, our enterprise does not depend on
espousing or denying these values.
11. Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 801 (1993).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 797.
14. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71
TI. L. REV. 747, 748 (1993).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 747.
17. Id. at 751.
18. Id. at 749 n.6.
19. See NiCCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 85 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price eds., 1988).
20. What follows is a bold and unqualified restatement of some of the key points in Commerce &
Communication. For a similar series of declarations prompted by earlier commentaries on our First
Amendmentviews, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The FirstAmendment in Bold Relief:
A Reply, 68 TEX. L. R . 1185 (1990).
1993]
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0 To the degree that we dwell on the values of the traditional
First Amendment, we do so in order to examine the apparent
dissonance between theory and praxis. Simply stated, can the
high values of free expression be squared with the operation of
commercial speech as it exists in the modern mass advertising
culture?
0 To say that traditional free speech values cannot be squared
in the above manner is not to say that commercial speech
automatically should be denied First Amendment protection. It
is only to say that the reason(s) for protecting commercial
communication must be other than the espoused traditional
norms.
0 We ask, and we invite our readers to ask: What conception
of the First Amendment would be most compatible with
commercial discourse as we have come to know it? What candid
and honest view of the First Amendment might countenance a
generous measure of protection for commercial speech?
0 Having asked the above question, we suggest one possible
answer: Constitutional protection of speech in the service of
selling is entirely consistent with the values of a highly capitalis-
tic and consumerist culture. Here again, our endeavor does not
depend on approving or disapproving this answer.
0 This answer raises yet another question: What would be the
social and legal consequences of signing on to such a view of the
First Amendment?
In our other writings, we pose still more questions and tender still
more answers. Whether the topic is commercial discourse in a consumerist
culture,2' political discourse in a television culture,' or pornographic
discourse in an entertainment culture,' our methodology remains largely
the same.
II. Reading Between the Lines
We appreciate the caution with which Rodney Smolla sometimes
approaches our arguments. When addressing us directly, he never accuses
us of withdrawing commercial speech from the orbit of the First Amend-
21. Collins & Skover, supra note 7.
22. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers,
68 TEX. L. REv. 1087 (1990).
23. RoNALD K.L. COLUNS & DAVID M. SKOVER, Discourse & Intercourse, in THE DEATH OF
DISCOURSE (forthcoming).
[Vol. 71:819
The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship
ment. Thus, we only "intimate" 24 governmental regulation, or "appar-
ently"25 contemplate it, or "appear"' to be of such a mind. Yet, he
cannot resist doing indirectly what he refrained from doing directly. For,
by Smolla's account, we are evidently in favor of "disqualifying most
modem mass advertising from constitutional protection" or alternatively
"reducing the level" of that protectionY And as the alleged "proponents
of regulation,"' we simply have not made a case for "enact[ing our
preferences] into law."29
Mindful of what we actually stated in Commerce & Communication,
we ask our readers to judge for themselves:
0 Nowhere do we state what Smolla implies we do. In fact,
we offer much to the contrary; we dedicate some four pages of
argument to critiquing the progressive broadside against commer-
cial speech in the American culture.'
0 Our question: "How can a free speech theory with strong
socialist or even neo-Marxist overtones be adopted by a capitalis-
tic culture? Part of being the American capitalistic culture is
having the American mass advertising system."31
* Our conclusion: "Advertising has become an essential thread
in the American cloth. Ultimately, the progessives' radical
critique is likely to fail because consumerist America would
inevitably recognize that one cannot remove the thread without
unraveling the cloth."32
* Discussing the futility of true-false distinctions in much
commercial speech, we note "the pointlessness of legal regulation
of pecuniary truth."33
0 To repeat: "Speaking from a First Amendment definitional
standpoint, it is increasingly difficult to demarcate the realms of
the commercial from those of the political and cultural, to
distinguish commercial expression from the most preferred forms
of democratic speech."'M
24. Smolla, supra note 11, at 786.
25. Id. at 781 n.21.
26. Id. at 791.
27. Id. at 780 (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 802.
29. Id. at 784 n.31.
30. Collins & Skover, supra note 9, at 741-44.
31. Id. at 744.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 739.
34. Id. at 743.
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0 In the clash between press freedom and the public's so-called
right to know, we're rather forthright: "[The right to know
cannot co-exist easily with commercial mass advertising. " "
0 We take some issue with Justice Hugo Black's implication
that the First Amendment endorses affirmative governmental
regulation of private commercial communication: "To restructure
the First Amendment so as to permit some governmental regula-
tion of corporate advertising messages is to set the legal
guarantee against the commercial culture."36
Certainly, Smolla (and the Kozinski-Banner team) should understand
that we are not purposively bent on killing the sacred cow 7 of commer-
cial-speech protection. As long as they and their like address the apparent
dissonance between traditional First Amendment theory and praxis, the cow
might be milked for all it's worth.
In addition to his apparent claim that we are the harbingers of First
Amendment commercial-speech regulation, Smolla (and the Kozinski-
Banner duo 8) implicitly cast us as elitist and undemocratic-those Allan
Bloom 9 types. Ostensibly, Smolla situates us among the intellectuals who
claim "a mandate to push government to regulate mass culture in the
service of elevating it.. .. " After all, we are the ones "presuming to
regulate mass advertising in order to defend high culture or to elevate
public discourse ... ."'
Once again, we find such claims puzzling. Ironically, we are the very
ones who point out that "the progressive view.., is likely to be seen as
manipulative, elitist, and undemocratic."' (In an earlier work, we
argued that intrusive governmental regulation of commercial television
"would be viewed as the segue to an aristocratic (and, therefore, un-
American) displacement of egalitarian and mass tastes."43 ) Furthermore,
we baldly assert that "America's self-identity is bound up with commer-
35. Id. at 740.
36. Id. at 727.
37. See JOHN CIARDI, A BRowsER's DICTIONARY AND NATIVE GUIDE TO THE UNKNOWN
AMEmICAN LANGUAGE 342 (1980).
38. See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 753 (discussing the highbrowed
preferences of those in the academy who "read more books than average").
39. See Benjamin Barber, 7he Philosopher Despot: Allan Bloom's Elitist Agenda; H.D. Forbes,
Opening the Open Mind, and Richard Rorty, Straussianism, Democracy, andAllan Bloom I: That Old
Tune Philosophy, in ESSAYS ON THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 79-124 (Robert L. Stone ed.,
1989) (commenting on the question: "Bloom on Democracy: Is He an Elitist?").
40. Smolla, supra note 11, at 784.
41. Id. at 786.
42. Collins & Skover, supra note 9, at 742.
43. Collins & Skover, supra note 22, at 1118.
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cialism" 4 and that "it is impossible to disentangle commerce from com-
munication and preserve America as we know it."' Such concessions,
of course, ought not to imply that we go to the other extreme and embrace
the excesses of contemporary commercial communication. Our express
purpose, it must be remembered, is more descriptive than normative.
More importantly, Smolla challenges our depiction of the culture of
commercial communication. He contends that "the threats to public
discourse posed by contemporary mass advertising are largely exagger-
ated."' Although our portrait of the mass advertising culture is "an
arresting caricature,"47 Smolla finds the notion that advertising's messages
"really do influence us, indeed actually transform us, in deep and signifi-
cant ways"4" to be "ingenious but not convincing." 49 He explains that
advertisements "rarely penetrate or connect"' because "[w]e often do not
stop to even read or watch the ads,"51 and when we do, "certainly no one
must pay attention."52
To pursue the inquiry, Smolla asked colleagues and friends: "Does
advertising cause them to think of themselves differently? To make
irrational purchases? To speak and write in ways that lose any grounding
in reality or logic?"53 The conclusion of his "nonscientific polling":
"Most people ... profess to have relatively strong advertising immune
systems and do not feel that they are being transformed in any alarming
sense."' Furthermore, in the style of a personal confession, he admits
to fantasizing now and then that he might "be like Mike"55 when wearing
his basketball shoes, but asks us: "What harm to the consumer does this
fantasizing do? Who is hurt? Who is 'created' or 'reconstituted' or
'debased' or 'commodified?' . . . So what if I enjoy a little dreaming now
and then, even when prompted by my athletic shoes?"56
Notably, Smolla's contentions are made largely from an intellectual
perspective outside of much of our commercial-speech culture, a perspec-
tive that assumes (or privileges) rationality and individual self-determina-
tion. But, as emphasized in Commerce & Communication, product-image,
44. Collins & Skover, supra note 9, at 743.
45. Id. at 742.
46. Smolla, supra note 11, at 777.
47. Id. at 778.
48. Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 797.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 802 n.95.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 802 (discussing the advertising lines used "in commercials featuring the Chicago Bulls'
basketball superstar, Michael Jordan").
56. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
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product-personality, and lifestyle advertising make no serious effort to
address audiences in a rational manner as individual economic decision-
makers.57 These forms of advertising often work best when they invite
us to set aside precisely the questions Smolla asked of his friends and
colleagues. Having largely buried those questions, can consumers really
be expected to resurrect them so as to indict themselves?
Predictably, the subjects of Smolla's polling experiment would not
regard themselves as irrationally influenced and profoundly transformed by
modern advertising. Even if consumers distanced themselves from their
own consumption habits so as to evaluate their behavior more honestly and
critically, it would be impossible for them to imagine who they would be
in a culture in which consumption is not a governing ideology. Simply
consider America's most favored public forum-the shopping mall.
Commenting on the more than seven-acre Mall of America in Minneapolis,
Alan Durning of the Worldwatch Institute demonstrates the extent to which
consumption has become an American institution:
We visit [shopping malls] more often than we go to church, and our
teenagers spend more time there than anywhere but home or school.
(Ninety-three percent of teenage girls rank shopping their favorite
activity.) Malls have become the town squares of our public life,
and the brand names and chain stores they host have become the
icons of our popular culture.58
Hence, what must be asked is not whether one is injured personally in any
physical or psychic way by fleeting and momentary dreams of being "like
Mike," but rather whether such dreams generally influence the
extravagance of consumption.
Moreover, our overall portrayal of the commercial culture does not
turn on assessments of the seductive power of particular advertisements to
dictate particular buyer behaviors. As Leo Bogart forcefully puts it:
"[Advertising's] importance lies not in having elicited a specific purchase
response to a specific ad. The real significance of advertising is its total
cumulative weight as part of the culture-in the way in which it contributes
to the popular lore of ideas and attitudes toward consumer products."59
It is the essential role of advertising in developing the consumer culture's
pervasive ideology-that we regularly identify ourselves by our habits,
patterns, and communities of consumption-which is the focal point of a
perspective more complex and dynamic than Smolla indicates.' In part,
57. Collins & Skover, supra note 9, at 700-07.
58. Alan Durning, . . . And Too Many Shoppers: What Malls and Materialism Are Doing to the
Planet, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23, 1992, at C3.
59. LEO BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 107 (2d ed. 1984), quoted in Collins & Skover,
supra note 9, at 728 n.169.
60. In his response, Leo Bogart both asserts this point and warns us not to "minimize its
[Vol. 71:819
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this perspective informs Sut Jhally's account of consumption as "an
inherently social activity, not an individual one."61 So in his urirestrained
reply, Jhally admonishes us "to put aside such ideologically inspired
idiocy" as "the prevailing nonsense about the marketplace of ideas and
advertising as a form of information."62
II. Crossing Over the Line
There is much in Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner's informative
treatment of the doctrinal history of commercial speech with which we take
no exception. For example, the result in Valentine v. Chrestensen! might
be attributed to reasons like those ably set out by Kozinski and Banner.'
A court sitting in 1942, rather than 1993, would not have understood mass
advertising as speech entitled to First Amendment protection because the
merger so obvious today between commercial discourse and the American
culture had not yet sufficiently developed. Accordingly, we are very much
intrigued by our colleagues' historical and doctrinal findings. But,
sometimes, in toeing their line they cross over our line. The result of this
trespass is misrepresentation.
Kozinski and Banner are blunt: Collins and Skover "say [that
commercial speech] deserves no protection .... "I In light of our reply
to Rodney Smolla, we need not say more on this point. We do, however,
invite Leo Bogart to take the stand as a witness for the defense:
The authors take us right up to the brink of the conclusion that
advertising should not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment,
but they never make it over the edge. While they set up a vigorous-
ly phrased brief against advertising, they distance themselves from
it in the concluding section of their paper ....
The greater force of the Kozinski-Banner critique turns on two other
arguments. They describe our work first as "ahistorical," 67 weakened by
complexity." Leo Bogart, Freedom to Know or Freedom to Say?, 71 TEX. L. REv. 815, 816 (1993).
This warning is well-taken. But how we are to investigate the ways in which various life "relationships
influence our consumption habits, and ... consumption influences them in turn" is another question
for another forum. Id. What is telling, however, is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate
out these interactive forces. Clearly, commerce is in our veins, befriending red corpuscles and warring
with the white ones.
61. Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective Values, and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REv. 805, 808
(1993).
62. Id. at 814.
63. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
64. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 12, at 754-74.
65. Id. at 752. Later, they reiterate that we hold that commercial speech "isn't protected by the
First Amendment." Id. at 753.
66. Bogart, supra note 60, at 816.
67. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 748 (emphasis in original).
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"a romanticized vision of the past."68 "We have no reason to believe,"
Kozinski and Banner counsel our readers, "that reasoned discourse
represented any greater fraction of total communication 200 or 100 years
ago than it does now. " '
That discourse may have been more enlightened a century or two ago
is a claim that we neither do nor need make. What we do opine, however,
is that functionalist "reason-why" advertising represented a greater
proportion of mass commercial discourse one hundred years ago. And,
more importantly, even if Kozinski and Banner can show otherwise, the
task of reconciling the traditional First Amendment to today's commercial
expression is thereby made no easier.
Romanticizing the past is one thing; romanticizing the present is yet
another. Who among us is the out-of-touch-with-reality romanticist? Is it
the one who recognizes dissonance between modem mass advertising and
the First Amendment's touted norms of rationality and individuality? Or,
is it rather the one who continues to justify First Amendment protection for
commercial speech along those traditional lines? Kozinski and Banner
exhibit a sophisticated understanding of the workings of commercial
advertising. Why, then, do they appear to toe the old First Amendment
line that romanticizes the present? (Gentlemen, if you hold otherwise, just
speak the words and the truth will set you free.)
Not only is our work described as ahistorical, but Kozinski and
Banner consider it "antihistorical" as well.' Dividing the universe of
First Amendment interpretations into two categories-"the history-based
and the theory-based"' 1 -Kozinski and Banner label ours "as close to a
pure theory-based [approach to the First Amendment] as one is ever likely
to find."' They charge: "The essay contains no mention of the actual
words of the First Amendment, no discussion of any cases interpreting the
First Amendment ... , and no attempt to discern what the real-life First
Amendment might mean."'
We plead no contest to the charge that we have not added to the
voluminous and often hackneyed debate droning on the subject of historical
intent and its relationship to constitutional interpretation. It is enough for
our limited purposes to remind folks that James Madison, the Father of the
First Amendment, was not mad about this method.74 And we leave it to
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 749 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 750.
73. Id.; see also infra note 76.
74. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 LETrERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228 (William C. Rives & Phillip R. Fendall eds., R. Worthington 1884)
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our colleagues to engage in the more esoteric debate as to whether even
mechanical historicism is not in some way theory-based. Since we
ultimately take no stand on whether commercial speech should or should
not be constitutionally protected, we trust that history and decisional law
will support us in some respect.
If Kozinski and Banner must divide the universe of First Amendment
thinking, why must it be restricted to history-based or theory-based
approaches alone? Why can't the "real-life First Amendment" (their
words, our emphasis)75 be understood from the vantage point of the real-
life experience of commercial discourse? To do that would require yet an
additional approach-what in another essay76 we call a "cultural ap-
proach" to the First Amendment. This approach asks several significant
questions: If we look at American discourse as it is, rather than as it
should be, what would we find? Having made such a discovery, what then
would our notions of the First Amendment be were they premised on that
experience? Nothing here should be unfamiliar to the careful reader of
Commerce & Communication who is invited to consider an approach to the
First Amendment consistent with the realities of the marketplace of
commercial discourse.
Our colleagues close their challenging response by calling on
Holmes.' We, too, find it convenient to invoke the old master, for he
appears to have been of two minds on the role of history. In a speech
delivered in 1895 at a Harvard Law School Association dinner honoring
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Holmes cautioned: "[The present has a
right to govern itself so far as it can ... ."' Even more striking are
Holmes's observations made in his 1897 article, The Path of the Law.79
"We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism,"'m admonished Holmes.
"I look forward," he added, "to a time when the part played by history in
the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious
research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be
("As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and incidental
decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character.').
75. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 750.
76. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the
First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783 (1993). Apropos of their comment, Kozinski and Banner
might be interested to know that this other essay reproduces the full text of the First Amendment, but
we suspect that they will not appreciate our effort.
77. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 775.
78. THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 184 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992)
[hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES].
79. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 78, at 160-77.
80. Id. at 474, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 78, at 174.
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attained and the reasons for desiring them."81 Insofar as the Kozinski and
Banner line moves beyond these admonitions, it borders on dead-letter law.
Finally, our colleagues depict us as prominent members of the "we're-
going-to-hell-in-a-handbasket"I crowd of curmudgeons.' We appreci-
ate this depiction nearly as much as the Devil loves holy water. Remem-
ber, the commercial culture appears low only from the lofty place of
traditional First Amendment values. In one important sense, low or lofty
is of no moment to us. Unless free speech law is squared with modern
commercial communication, we need not sit in judgment over this matter.
Till then, we are content to give the Devil his due and are willing to echo
the words of the pimp in the musical theater production of Miss Saigon:
What's that I smell in the air,
the American dream.
Sweet as a new millionaire,
the American dream.
Pre-packed, ready to wear,
the American dream.
Fat, like a choe'late eclair,
when you suck out the cream.
Luck by the tail.
How can you fail?
And best of all it's for sale,
the American dream.
Schlitz down the drain.
Pop the champagne.
It's time we all entertain
My American dream.84
IV. Armchair Psychology and First Amendment Ideology
Why do Smolla, Kozinski, Banner, and others before thems-all
good-natured and knowledgeable thinkers-portray us to be something
81. Id.
82. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 749 n.6.
83. Properly understood, we don't mind being labeled as curmudgeons. See THE PORTABLE
CURMUDGEON 1-6 (Jon Winoker ed., 1987) ("A curmudgeon's reputation for malevolence is unde-
served. They're neither warped nor evil at heart.. . They hurl polemical thunderbolts at middle-
class values and pop culture in order to preserve their sanity.").
84. TheAmericanDream,from MIss SAIGON (Original LondonCastRecording, Geffen Co. 1990).
See generally EDWARD BEIR & MARK STEYN, THE STORY OF MISS SAIGON 148-55 (1991) (describing
the Vietnam of Miss Saigon as a dark mirror-image of the American dream).
85. See generally Collins& Skover, supra note 20, at 1186-87, 1189-92 (responding to criticisms
of Martin H. Redish, Killing the First Amendment with Kindness: A Troubled Reaction to Collins and
Skover, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1147 (1990) and Mark V. Tushnet, Decoding Television (andLaw Reviews),
68 TEX. L. REV. 1179 (1990)).
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other than what we say we are? What drives them to brand us (expressly
or implicitly) as enemies of First Amendment freedoms? More generally,
is there a pathology in much contemporary scholarship on the First
Amendment?
In the liberal community and the legal academy, few things are more
sacrosanct than the First Amendment. On this point, Frederick Schauer,
a noted free speech scholar, hammers away: "[A] broadly protective
understanding of the First Amendment is taken as an orthodoxy-or
ideology... -in a large number of academic and professional environ-
ments .... "6 In other words, "there seems to be, within these
domains, little free thought about free thought, little free inquiry about free
inquiry, and little free speech about free speech."" Thus, where the First
Amendment is the measure, more is always better.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that any far-reaching and
probing analysis of free speech jurisprudence will trigger hypersensitive
reactions. This is especially true with unorthodox inquiries that play
different ideological stances against each other. After all, who knows
where the pursuits of such "crazy people" will lead? Consistent with this,
what our critics gather to be a less than edifying account of the commercial
speech culture is likely to be a source of anxiety. From our account they
presumably surmise a hostile First Amendment posture and consequently
fear that we will pull the First Amendment away from the enterprise of
commercial speech. No amount of Valium or Xanax89 can cure this
anxiety. Yet, if truth be known, our design is to push the First
Amendment closer to the commercial-speech culture, albeit at the risk of
disowning old theory that cannot be easily, if at all, reconciled with praxis.
For our critics and their like, the First Amendment must remain a
totem not associated with any taboo. But it is hard to retain that mindset
when core free speech concepts such as rational decisionmaking and self-
realization are held up to the realities of our modern mass advertising
culture. For that reason alone, Justice Harry Blackmun and others may
feel some compunction to perpetuate an ignoble lie, namely, that this
culture and these concepts can co-exist free of cognitive dissonance. Or
they may prefer to be silent, cherishing commercial speech in a way not
dependent on any noble values. But they cannot bring themselves to
86. Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 854
(1992).
87. Id. at 856.
88. THE PILL BOOK 240-43 (5th rev. ed., 1992) (an anti-anxiety drug of the Diazepam family).
89. Id. at 35-38 (an anti-anxiety drug of the Alprazolam fanily). But cf. High Anxiety, CONSUMER
REPORTS, Jan. 1993, at 19-24 (warning that Xanax is highly addictive and possibly ineffective in
treating anxiety).
90. See Collins & Skover, supra note 4, at 728-31.
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profess a glaring point: If commercial speech is to be protected for what
it is, basically it must be valued as speech in the service of selling.
Just how long can contemporary First Amendment discourse repress
this point? What is the future of an illusion that yesterday's marketplace
of ideas and today's marketing of items can be valued for the same reason?
If the ardent defenders of commercial speech could only bring themselves
to confront these questions, then the arduous process of a much-needed
therapy could begin. We wish-them well.
